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ABSTRACT
Across many industries, systems are exceeding their
intended design lives, whether they are ships, bridges or
military aircraft. As a result failure rates can increase and
unanticipated wear or failure conditions can arise. Health
monitoring research and application has the potential to
more safely lengthen the service life of a range of systems
through utilization of sensor data and knowledge of failure
mechanisms to predict component life remaining. A further
benefit of health monitoring when combined across an
entire platform is system health management. System health
management is an enabler of condition based maintenance,
which allows repair or replacement based on material
condition, not a set time. Replacement of components based
on condition can enable cost savings through fewer parts
being used and the associated maintenance costs. The goal
of this research is to show the management of system health
can provide savings in maintenance and logistics cost while
increasing vehicle availability through the approach of
condition based maintenance.
This work examines the impact of prediction accuracy
uncertainty in remaining useful life prognostics for a
squadron of 12 aircraft. The uncertainty in this research is
introduced in the system through an uncertainty factor
applied to the useful life prediction. An ARENA discrete
event simulation is utilized to explore the effect of
prediction error on availability, reliability, and maintenance
and logistics processes. Aircraft are processed through
preflight, flight, and post-flight operations, as well as
maintenance and logistics activities. A baseline case with
traditional time driven maintenance is performed for
comparison to the condition based maintenance approach of
this research.
This research does not consider cost or decision making
processes, instead focusing on utilization parameters of both
_____________________
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aircraft and manpower. The occurrence and impact of false
alarms on system performance is examined. The results
show the potential availability, reliability, and maintenance
benefits of a health monitoring system and explore the
diagnostic uncertainty.
1. BACKGROUND
Across military and commercial fleets, aircraft are an
example where lengthening service lives and budget
constraints can adversely affect safety. As a result, more
frequent inspections are required as service life increases to
ensure safety of the users and the environment. However,
the cost of large scale modifications or replacement in the
case of hundreds of aircraft is a significant hurdle to
overcome in most instances (Shoup, Donohue, & Lang,
2011). The impact of shrinking budgets can also reduce
inspection frequency or delay needed repairs in favor of
only performing mission critical tasks (Roach, 2009).
Maintenance strategies must change to meet the extended
in-service requirements and the constraints imposed by
shrinking government and industry budgets.
Condition based maintenance (CBM) is an evolving
maintenance concept with a goal of reducing maintenance
and thus life cycle costs while increasing operational
availability made possible, in part, by leveraging health
monitoring techniques. Department of Defense Instruction
(DoDI) 4151.22 defines CBM as “the application and
integration of appropriate processes, technologies, and
knowledge-based capabilities to achieve the target
availability, reliability, and operation and support costs of
DoD systems and components across their life cycle,”
(Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L), May 2008, p. 1-1).
Integrated system health management and its impact on
performance, cost, supply chain as well as traditional
maintenance inspections and practices are the focus of this
research. With the F-35 maintenance and logistics alone
projected to cost $1.1 trillion over the 55 year life span amid
shrinking defense budgets, the need to reduce the life cycle
cost (LCC) of military aircraft is paramount (Shalal-Esa,
2013). Additionally, legacy aircraft may not be fitted with
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the proper sensors to fully implement health assessment
leading to costly inspections, in both time and maintenance
dollars. This reduces operational availability (Ao) and the
funds available for other needs.
CBM is a demand driven maintenance process based on
indications of stresses or impending failure of a component
or system. When appropriately applied, CBM has the
potential to reduce lifecycle cost and increase mission
reliability by eliminating unnecessary maintenance actions
(Butcher, 2000). Ellis (2008) argues that cost-effective
systems monitoring allows repair actions based on system
condition rather than costly time-based maintenance.
Additionally, maintenance may be forecast for completion
that minimizes impact on the operational mission of the
system. Secondary failures, where one component’s failure
causes adverse performance or accelerated degradation of
interrelated components, may also be reduced by
implementing CBM as a result of prompt repair or
replacement of the primary cause of fault.
CBM compares data collected from vehicle systems and
their components and compares that information with a
predetermined threshold prior to failure, or to failure for
some non-critical components, then dictates repairs or
replacement of parts. Additionally, interim time based
inspections required under the baseline preventive
maintenance (PM) approach are forgone, or significantly
reduced in frequency, in lieu of continuous analysis of the
aircraft via the integrated systems health management
(ISHM) system.
CBM requires sensor or inspection data to accurately
diagnose the condition of a component. Manual inspections
can prove costly in terms of time to perform if the part
requires disassembly or removal of other components to
observe its condition. Technology exists for some, and is
under development for other components, to determine wear
or impending failure conditions in lieu of manual
inspections (Glaser, Li, Wang, Ou, & Lynch, 2007;
Speckmann, 2007). The data from these health monitoring
sensors may then be compiled to predict remaining useful
life. Certainty is not 100%, be it in the interpretation of data
collected on component condition or in prediction of
remaining life based on that sensor data. This uncertainty
has the potential to lead to poor estimation of component
condition, which can result in false conclusions about safety
of flight decisions and ultimately to critical failures.
1.1. Integrated Systems Health Management Enabler
The benefits of ISHM are the abilities to reduce inspection
length, defer maintenance and migrate to maintenance on
demand with the end goal to increase operational
availability through reduced maintenance time (Speckmann,
2007). Applying ISHM enables CBM as opposed to
preprogrammed periodic maintenance practices; that is,
maintaining only when required instead of when prescribed

by schedules, thus optimizing maintenance labor (Roach,
2009). SHM technologies and resulting modified
maintenance programs serve to reduce the total life-cycle
cost of a system and increase availability. While this may
drive increased acquisition cost of a weapon system or
aircraft due to the inclusion of health monitoring systems,
the goal is to offset the increase with reduced operations and
maintenance costs over the life of the program. Published
literature shows the savings potential of ISHM enabled
condition based maintenance on aircraft life cycle cost:





40% for vehicle maintenance (Walls, Thomas, &
Brady, 1999)
30% to 50% for fuselage panels (Pattabhiraman,
Kim, & Haftka, 2010)
10% electrical components (Scanff et al., 2007)
50-80% for the Boeing 777 (Gorinevsky, Gordon,
Beard, Kumar, & Chang, 2005).

In general, an application project could choose to increase
the detection capability, accepting a higher acquisition cost
with the goal of lowering the overall system life cycle cost
through more efficient operations and maintenance. For a
given detection system, however, increasing the detection
capability (e.g., lowering a threshold) will come at the
expense of a degraded false alarm rate; the two are
competing objectives. Ultimately, the value of the
prognostic system will depend on the achievable balance
between detectability for safety concerns and acceptable
false alarm rates to avoid unnecessary and expensive
maintenance actions. Aircraft, or other vehicle, availability
is linked to the balance of sensor reliability and detectability
and the capability of the system to decrease maintenance
duration (Hoyle, Mehr, Turner, & Chen, 2007).
It is important to understand that uncertainty will exist in the
diagnosis and prognosis of system health. Numerous points
of entry exist for uncertainty to work its way into remaining
useful life (RUL) prediction. Component performance data
is dependent on sensor health and accuracy. It is also
difficult to anticipate the exact conditions, load,
environment, etc, that the vehicle or machine will undergo
during operation or storage. Quantifying and compiling
these uncertainties is a difficult task individually and made
harder by potential amplifying effects on each other.
Sankararaman and Goebel (2013) discuss factors of
uncertainty in RUL prediction and lay out methods to
quantify and interpret the sources. They also stress the need
to accurately determine the uncertainty in the prediction for
the prediction to be of use. The goal is that the probabilistic
estimates of RUL based on real time monitoring allow
increased time to accumulate on parts, thus increasing the
MTBF for the ISHM aircraft and generating savings through
fewer spares procurements or repair actions.
Determining the effectiveness of system health monitoring
approaches requires a method for comparison of techniques.
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The remainder of this paper discusses modeling approaches,
evaluation techniques and results of this research.
2. MODELING APPROACHES
Research into the effects of prognostics on integrated
logistics, maintenance and aircraft systems frequently
neglects the impact of uncertainty on HM model outcomes.
Rebulanan utilizes a discrete event simulation to represent
the F-35 autonomic logistic system (ALS) system with a
health management system, LRUs, communication system,
supply, and maintenance systems (Rebulanan, 2000).
Rebulanan further evaluates performance with aircraft
availability, mission capable and non-mission capable rates,
and mission reliability. Rebulanan’s model shows
sensitivity of the supply wait time to the detection lead time
for an impending failure and the supply stock levels. This
outcome is somewhat intuitive in that as the prognosis of an
impending failure is detected earlier and with greater
accuracy, the supply system can plan further in advance,
ensuring parts are available when required.
Rodrigues and Yoneyama (2012; 2013) explore the effect of
prognostics on spare parts inventories for both repairable
and non-repairable systems compared with conventional
supply processes. Both studies, simulated over 15 years
each, show cost savings for the ISHM enabled system over
the conventional one. In their work on non-repairable items
they discuss uncertainty in failures and their impact on
supply policy, but they do not include the impact of
prognostic uncertainty on maintenance operations for false
alarm adjudication or aircraft operational availability.
Similarly, while they do address prognostic error in
repairable systems they focus on the impact of sparing to
account for fleet availability without addressing false alarms
and how they might drive costs. Both works provide an
excellent analysis of the cost impact of sparing decisions
based upon health monitoring information. Out of stock
costs are difficult to quantify but do impact down time for
supply, which is where the impact is captured in our
research model. A limitation of the nor-repairable study is
that only one item is investigated, leaving interactions of
multiple components in question.
Kählert, Giljohanan and Klingauf (2014) utilize a MATLAB
discrete event simulation to analyze one Lufthansa A320
component with 100% unscheduled replacement. They
utilize process times, reliability, prognostic accuracy, and
cost to evaluate PHM system performance. Additionally, the
use of historic Lufthansa maintenance data provides added
realism in the research. The research focus only extends for
two weeks around a replacement, thus leaving out some
potential for a false alarm condition to exist prematurely.
One of their final conclusions is a realistic PHM system
could save approximately 20% of annual fleet operation
costs.

3. MODEL DESCRIPTION
In this research, an Arena discrete event simulation is
utilized to represent a squadron of 12 aircraft and their
associated mission, maintenance and supply processes over
a 15 year duration. This model explores the impacts to this
squadron in analyzing a model containing elements not
addressed in the works of section 2. The authors add
uncertainty not found in Rebulanan’s work with an
interaction of multiple components missing from Rodriques
and Yoneyama.
3.1. Model Components and Architecture
The initial component failure properties were randomly
generated from a uniform(250,1000) distribution for parts
A-T. These times are then utilized for component
replacements in the model. Each aircraft is generated and
assigned 20 components with a failure time randomly
sampled from an exponential distribution, with mean time
between failure (MTBF) given in Table 1, and with
probability
distribution
function:

f ( x) 

1

e

 x

, for x  0 . The exponential distribution

is chosen as a representative reliability function for the
components for simplicity in model calculations of the
constant failure rate. The model can readily accept another
failure distribution with other components.
Part
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
N
O
P
Q
R
S
T

MTBF (hours)
502
280
775
750
763
364
441
829
769
941
778
363
272
642
696
268
822
585
996
842

Table 1: Components Failure Times
The sampled failure times are considered “truth” in terms of
component failure times. That is, if the line replaceable unit
(LRU) incurs more than the associated failure time in hours
without being repaired or preemptively replaced as a result
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of scheduled preventive maintenance, overhaul in the
baseline case or ISHM indicated replacement in the
prognostic case, a failure occurs. Aircraft flow through
preflight processing and mission preparation prior to
actually flying an assigned mission. The ISHM system
performs a scan to determine if the aircraft is anticipated to
have enough useful life to complete the mission. Each
component decreases its life only during engine running
operations: taxi, take-off, flying, landing and parking. In this
work, it is assumed that LRUs operate until failure. These
processes are visually depicted in Figure 1.
After sortie completion, diagnostics are again performed
and in the baseline case, maintenance is performed as well.
ISHM aircraft perform post flight scan and if acceptable are
released for next flight. Baseline aircraft are inspected and
checked for LRU preventive maintenance time. If PM is not
required, routine maintenance and inspections are performed
and the aircraft released for next mission. Aircraft are then
either parked until their next mission or turned for another
flight.
In the maintenance module, the number of indicated failures
is recorded and the maintenance clock starts. A detailed
inspection is performed for both the ISHM and baseline
cases, though shorter for the ISHM case. False alarms are
recorded and in the ISHM case if a false alarm threshold
over the lifetime of the part is reached, the ISHM system
undergoes maintenance. The model indicates a false alarm
condition if the predicted component RUL is less than the
“truth” remaining time minus a safety factor and the
anticipated sortie duration. In the baseline case supply stock
is reduced and if not in stock the aircraft is grounded until
the part arrives. Parts are processed by supply (occurs

simultaneously with other aircraft operations in the ISHM
case) and transferred from supply to maintenance. Aircraft
are maintained and LRU(s) life characteristics are resampled
from the failure distribution(s) in Table 1. The aircraft repair
is checked and the vehicle is routed back into the mission
queue. In the ISHM case, if the standby time until the next
mission is greater than the mean time to perform any
outstanding maintenance actions, the aircraft is routed to be
maintained so as not to impact mission operations. In the
baseline case, unless the part is scheduled for preventive
maintenance the condition is not known thus the need for
repair or replacement is unanticipated and the aircraft
continues normal mission operations. Maintenance actions
are performed serially on each aircraft, that is, only one
inspection or maintenance action at a time, continuing until
all required actions are complete. This assumption likely
over constrains maintenance personnel actions, leading to
slightly higher maintenance delays, but is done for model
simplicity and has the same effect on the baseline and health
monitoring cases. It is assumed that all component
inspection times for indicated or actual failures are
triangularly distributed (20, 30, 45) minutes and LRU
replacements triangularly distributed (60, 90, 240) minutes.
These times were chosen to represent a range of repairs and
inspections while not portraying items which may require
multiple days to maintain. Additionally, in this research
required personnel for maintenance actions are always
considered available. LRUs are always replaced when they
are serviced.
Supplies are input into the model at an initial stock level and
a reorder point. In both the baseline and ISHM cases, the
stock level and reorder points are fixed for the simulation.

Figure 1: ISHM System Architecture
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The levels are discussed further in section 3.2. Once reorder
point is reached, the difference between stock level and
reorder point is ordered. Time between order and delivery is
log-normally distributed (2,1) days for all parts.
Additionally, a processing time upon receipt is incurred.
If RUL is within a 10 hour safety factor from failure the
aircraft is routed to maintenance. If RUL is within a
prescribed lead time window, a supply check is performed
and if parts aren’t in stock they are ordered to meet
predicted maintenance activities. If RUL is within a defined
maintenance window, component service can occur if the
parts are in stock or the aircraft can continue flying missions
if there is sufficient RUL.
3.2. Sensor and Prognostics Process
The ISHM routine begins by computing the remaining
useful life (RUL) of each component. The RUL prognosis
has two components, the diagnosis from the HM system and
the prediction uncertainty. In this research component
diagnostics is taken as perfect, i.e. sensor always knows
exact health. In new components sensor diagnostics can
have difficulty detecting the health state, thus providing data
that may not be useful. As failure becomes more imminent,
sensor diagnostics can provide a more exact condition
diagnosis. The resulting determination leads to component
RUL being predicted as:
(1)
Where Diagnosis is the log mean and equivalent to the true
remaining life and, uncertainty is the log standard deviation
defined in Eq. (2).
Uncertainty is varied in this research to determine the
impact of uncertain prognostics on Ao and sortie rates.
Uncertainty is calculated as:
(2)
Where Part RUL is the previous RUL prediction for that
part and, uncertainty factor is a design variable.
This information is sent to the CBM module where
maintenance predictions are performed. While no specific
RUL prognostic technique is used, the technique above is
utilized to represent compounded error or uncertainty built
up in the system. Initially, RUL estimation is chiefly
impacted by the uncertainty factor, but in section 4.2,
additional degradation to the system is added to account for
sensor diagnostic losses. Eqs. (1) and (2) are representative
equations developed by the authors to portray the behavior
of health monitoring systems. They are not intended to
mimic the performance of a particular system, but to
represent the functionality of a monitoring system. The
uncertainty factor is a representation of the accumulated
variability in the prognostics for remaining useful life. This
work ranges the uncertainty factor from a low of 0, to

represent perfect prognosis, to a high of 100, which
approaches half the MTBF of some parts. Examining a
range of variability between these end points allows system
designers to quantify how much uncertainty is acceptable in
a health monitoring system before selecting one for
inclusion on an aircraft.
The system then enters a decision node where the RUL is
compared to a set safety factor, which would be a policy
decision based on mission requirements. If there is RUL
above the safety factor and the projected sortie length does
not encroach on the safety factor, the aircraft is cleared for
flight. If the RUL is below the safety factor, the
component(s) are flagged and sent to maintenance. If RUL
is sufficient, the aircraft is cleared for the next process. In
all, the aircraft is checked prior to mission preparation
(fuelling and cargo loading), prior to take-off, during flight,
and upon landing. If all of these checks are satisfactory the
aircraft continues through missions and standby time until a
maintenance action is required.
The CBM system preorders parts to meet demands as
described above. If the part is not in stock, the aircraft is
placed in a non-mission capable supply hold until the part
arrives. Upon maintenance completion, the ISHM equipped
aircraft bypasses additional check-outs normally performed
to inspect work, instead relying on the ISHM system to
perform them. The aircraft is then released for the next
mission tasking.
3.3. Evaluation Parameters
Establishment of useful performance measures to evaluate
the model is essential. To that end, metrics currently used to
determine aircraft and system performance are preferred as
a means of comparison. Three categories of metrics,
although interwoven, are laid out below and are used when
discussing the results of this research: availability;
reliability; and maintenance.
3.3.1. Availability
To understand operational availability and why it is a good
measure of system performance for this model, it is useful to
be familiar with achieved and inherent availabilities as well.
Inherent availability (Ai) is the availability of a system
operating under an ideal support system. This means delays
for logistics, administrative delays and preventive
maintenance time are excluded, leaving only operating time
and corrective maintenance.
Achieved Availability (Aa) adds preventive maintenance to
Ai in addition to corrective maintenance. Logistics, supply
and administrative delays are ignored and those assets are
assumed to be instantaneously available when required.
Achieved availability is determined examining the mean
time between maintenance, MTBM, and the mean
maintenance time (MMT).
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Operational availability (Ao) adds the final piece to the
downtime portion of the equation. Ao includes logistics,
supply and administrative delays to the PM and CM for the
system resulting in the mean down time for the system.
Operational availability is the system availability the user of
a system realizes, (ReliaSoft, 2007). Mathematically,
operational availability is:
(3)
Where MLDT is the mean logistics delay time.
Eq. (3) is not the only way to define operational availability.
Pryor (2008) discusses methods to calculate Ao seen in Eq.
(4) using the uptime/(uptime + downtime) definition of Eq.
(3), but the definition is slightly different.
(4)
Where OT is the operational time,
ST is the standby time,
TPM is the total preventive maintenance time,
TCM is the total corrective maintenance time, and
TALDT is the total administrative and logistics delay time,
equivalent to MLDT.
Figure 2 shows the components of up and down times. This
is by no means an exhaustive list and further breakdowns
are possible, especially in the administrative and logistics
delay blocks, but for this research these components define
the temporal parameters.
Time

Active Time

Uptime
Standby
Time

Mission
Time
Operating
Time
Pre/Post Op
Checks

Inactive
Time
Downtime

Maintenance
Time
Pre/Post
flight
processing

Maintenance Administrative
Delay Time
Time

Logistics
Delay Time

Corrective
Maintenance
Preventive
Maintenance
Inspection

Figure 2: Components of System Usage Time (Pryor, 2008)
A function of a system’s operational availability, average
daily flying hours is a measurement of the ability of the
squadron as a whole to perform the assigned missions.
Further, the number of sorties flown per day is a function of
the mission requirements, but also the performance of the
aircraft as well as maintenance and logistics systems.

3.3.2. Reliability
In the commercial environment, up and down times can also
be assigned costs as the systems impact revenue generation.
Kählert, Giljohanan and Klingauf discuss dispatch
reliability, or the “ratio of revenue departures without delay
or cancellations compared to all flights,” (2014, p.1). They
go on to summarize commercial aircraft cost accounting for
delays and cancellations. Downtime has an associated cost
beyond maintenance labor in lost revenue. Similarly, uptime
has the potential to generate revenue, when not in a standby
capacity. For military systems, assigning costs to up and
downtime is problematic as there is no profit to generate and
supporting national security is difficult to assign a value to.
In essence, military aircraft are consumptive, always
operating at a loss. Policy and research can, however, strive
to reduce these consumption costs.
False alarms diagnosed or predicted by the ISHM system
drive unnecessary maintenance and supply actions as well
as placing an otherwise mission capable aircraft into a NMC
state. These maintenance and supply actions increase the
overall cost impact of the ISHM system as they are not free.
A key requirement for successful deployment of an ISHM
architecture enabling CBM is a low false alarm rate with
reliable detection (Ellis, 2008; Van Horenbeek, Van
Ostaeyen, Duflou, & Pintelon, 2013). False alarms in the
baseline model result from CND and RTOK discussed
previously. Totals for each of the models will be recorded
for comparison. Additionally, an increase in false alarms,
above a predetermined threshold, on an aircraft with an
ISHM system will trigger an inspection of the ISHM system
sensors providing erroneous data and potentially of the
ISHM system logic itself.
The ability to tolerate false alarms is a two-fold evaluation.
First, the cost associated with each false alarm shrinks any
cost benefit of the ISHM system over the baseline system.
Second, too many false alarms can trigger a “cry wolf”
attitude towards the system or result in wasted time
maintaining, or checking the system thus decreasing the
operational availability of the aircraft and the reliability of
the ISHM system. For an ISHM architecture to be effective
it cannot trigger excessive false alarms which, in turn,
trigger maintenance actions on the system.
3.3.3. Maintenance and Logistics
Inspection intervals are time driven processes under the
baseline aircraft case and are prescribed to monitor systems
for indications of damage. They are generally based on
historic or predicted failure data and are conducted to ensure
early indications of failure are discovered before they
catastrophically fail the system or adjacent components. An
assumption for this research is that all systems of interest on
the aircraft are monitored in the ISHM model. If that were
not the case time based, but informed through ISHM
inferences, inspections would still be required. In this
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research, the ISHM case only requires inspection upon
indication of failure or impending failure by the system.
Therefore, the inspection intervals should be further apart
and of shorter duration for ISHM than for time based
methods. The preprogrammed PM inspections of the
baseline are defined based on operating hours.
Accounting for the required time to repair and inspect
aircraft is critical in determining the impacts of system
changes to downtime and manpower costs. In addition to the
repair of malfunctioning components, inspections based
upon fault indications, either in performance or indicated by
the ISHM system, drive mission unavailability and decrease
system performance metrics. A common metric is to
measure the required maintenance man hours per aircraft
flight hour or MMH/FH. This factor can then be utilized in
forecasting manpower requirements and required downtime
based on mission requirements. Similarly, mean down time
(MDT), the average amount of time it takes to return an
aircraft to flying status once a fault is indicated, is a
commonly used maintenance performance metric.
Supply delay is the time between actual part need and when
the supply system delivers the part to maintenance and will
impact both the baseline and ISHM/CBM cases. Nonmission capable supply (NMCS) is the common measure of
this supply delay. The prognostic CBM case will anticipate
failure and sparing requirements further out from
maintenance demand and allow for advanced ordering if
stock levels are inadequate. The current baseline process
relies on anticipating failures and providing stock levels at
individual bases or in some cases a central location that can
be tasked to deliver spares when required. This process
increases the logistic footprint by requiring storage facilities
for materiel that may not be needed for upwards of a year.
Managing these spares and the facility requires additional
resources, manpower and money. “Logistics response time,
a measure of supportability and an indirect measure of
readiness,” (Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Logistics and Materiel Readiness, May, 2008, p. 6-4),
drives shorter maintenance times and as such impacts
supply and maintenance downtime.
While maintenance policy and cost decisions impact LRU
replacement decisions, the prognostics capability plays an
important role in determining when to repair or exchange
components. Confidence in the performance of the
diagnostics and prognostics systems could lead to a
decreasing safety factor as to when maintenance occurs.
This resulting increase in useable time of each part saves
money through extended service life for the components and
reduces the amount of supplies consumed. Capturing the
amount of useful life lost for the components can quantify
the gains that may be achievable.

3.4. Model Variables
This research explores the impact of RUL prediction
uncertainty on the availability, reliability, and maintenance
and logistics categories above. Evaluation of the model is
accomplished through simulation of 15 years of aircraft
utilization. Further, two design cases are initially utilized in
the simulations. The remaining useful life uncertainty factor
is varied at 14 levels with two false alarm limits at 0 and
10000 and the model assessed at each increment. The levels
for the FA limit is meant to indicate that at 0, the ISHM
system is always maintained after a false alarm and at
10000, policy allows nearly unlimited false alarms by the
ISHM system before requiring repair. These levels are
found in . At each uncertainty factor 100 simulations are run
to establish confidence in the results, and the means of these
data are presented. Sensitivity to values of FA limit greater
than 0 is presented later in this paper once sensor and
prognostics degradation are considered. Additionally, two
simulations of the baseline case with no prognostics are run
where component stock levels are varied.
Stock levels for the ISHM case are held to 1 nominally and
ordered as predicted by the system. In the baseline case, two
comparisons are examined, one where the stock levels are
kept the same as the ISHM case. The other stock level case
holds 4 parts in stock and reorders when the level drops to
2. This variance of stock level for the baseline case makes
the process comparable to minimal levels as in the ISHM
case and robust levels when failure is somewhat uncertain.
4. RESULTS
4.1. No ISHM Degradation Results
Daily flying hour averages for all simulation runs are
located in . It is noted in these data that a decrease of 19.04
flying hours per day occurs over the range of uncertainty
factors for a FA limit of 0. This decrease is smaller when the
FA limit is 10000, reaching 3.45 hours. This reduction
corresponds to 6949 and 1261 hours respectively in lost
flying each year, the equivalent of removing more than 1
aircraft’s missions from the flight taskings in the unlimited
case and over 5 aircraft in the 0 FA limit case. The last two
rows in contain performance results of the baseline model
where the numbers in parentheses represent the stock level
and reorder point respectively. For the baseline model, the
(1,0) supply case yields only 18.36 daily flying hours while
the (4,2) case achieves 27.94 hours. The chief cause of this
difference is attributed to the (1,0) case waiting for supplies
to be delivered as they are only ordered as needed and only
1 item is held in stock. The ISHM cases all benefit from the
prognostic capability of the ISHM system in ordering
supplies to meet requirements.
A typical measure when examining the maintenance
demand of an aircraft is maintenance man hours per flying
hour. Figure 3 examines MMH/FH for the case where all
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false alarms trigger ISHM system maintenance and the case
where FAs in the system do not incur ISHM maintenance,
merely downtime to adjudicate the alarm does not require
maintenance. As shown in Figure 3, the 0 FA limit case
MMH/FH increases linearly as the uncertainty factor
increases. This growth results from the number of
maintenance actions on the ISHM system as every FA
triggers ISHM maintenance. Maintaining the ISHM system
takes more time than merely adjudicating a false alarm by
the ISHM system thus the increase in maintenance hours. In
the case where FAs do not trigger ISHM repair, the
MMH/FH grow slowly reaching a maximum of 0.268 vs.
4.198 for the 0 FA case. Inspection and maintenance times
drive the maintenance hours and if inspection times were to
increase significantly, the number of false alarms shown in
Figure 4 could change the behavior of Figure 3.
Additionally, as the uncertainty factor increases more false
alarms occur as shown in Figure 4 as does the resulting
downtime associated with the false alarms observed in
Figure 5. For comparison, the baseline cases have MMH/FH
ratios of 0.546 and 0.549 for the (1,0) and (4,2) cases
respectively. In the baseline case, time based preventive
maintenance occurs at set intervals versus the condition
based method employed by CBM driving extra maintenance
hours.
ISHM False Alarm Limit
0
10000
Uncertainty
Factor
0
2
5
7
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100

Mean Daily Flying Hours
35.98
35.26
35.00
34.92
34.86
34.37
34.10
33.85
33.55
33.25
33.15
32.92
32.62
32.52

35.98
35.25
34.90
34.36
33.53
30.14
27.32
24.88
22.96
21.38
19.93
18.92
17.80
16.94

Baseline (1,0)

18.36

Baseline (4,2)

27.94

Baseline (1,0): 0.546
Baseline (4,2): 0.549

Figure 3: Maintenance Man Hours per Flight Hour
Figure 4 illustrates the average false alarms per aircraft per
year. The quantity increases from 0 for the 0 uncertainty
factor, perfect prognosis, case to 101.52 and 196.65 for the
0 and unlimited FA cases respectively at the 100 uncertainty
factor case. As observed in the figure, since the amount of
time spent in maintenance repairing the ISHM system for
every FA in the 0 limit case increases as the uncertainty
factor increases the number of false alarms is lower. It
should be noted that this is not a reduction in the FA rate, as
the prognosis accuracy is not degrading over time for this
initial investigation. This mostly results from the
maintenance time taking away time when the aircraft could
be flying and, as noted in , the mean daily flying hours are
nearly double for the unlimited FA case.

Table 2: Average Daily Flying Hours

Figure 4: False Alarms per Aircraft per Year

While the MMH/FH numbers are low for an entire aircraft,
for a system of subcomponents when scaled up it is feasible.
For example, the U.S. Air Force C-17 fleet operates around
6 MMH/FH (Nelms, 2008).

While the number of false alarms per aircraft per year is
nearly doubled in the 0 limit case versus the no limit case,
FA downtime increases at a considerably higher rate. As
shown in Figure 5, the average downtime each aircraft
experiences per year due to FA increases from 0 for the
perfect prognosis case to 111.31 hours for the unlimited FA

8

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PROGNOSTICS AND HEALTH MANAGEMENT

case and over 2000 hours for the FA limit 0 case. The
increase is attributed to the additional maintenance required
to maintain the ISHM system at the lower FA trigger.

Baseline (1,0): 171.82
Baseline (4,2): 17.47

Figure 6: Mean Down Time

Figure 5: False Alarm Downtime per Aircraft per Year
Compiling all components of downtime and the number of
times the aircraft is down for maintenance leads to the mean
down time for an occurrence. As shown in Figure 6, mean
down time decreases from 3.24 hours when the uncertainty
prognosis is perfect to a low 1.09 hours when the
uncertainty factor is 100 and FA limit is unlimited. This
decrease is attributed to the fact that while the aircraft is
being removed from service more often to adjudicate false
alarms as the uncertainty factor increases, the inspections do
not take as long as the aircraft is quickly returned to
operation. MDT for the 0 FA limit case grows as the
uncertainty factor rises, mostly due to all components
requiring inspection and sensor repair for each time down.
As uncertainty rises, the aircraft is brought down more
frequently, but more often for a false alarm than
maintenance actions. Adjudicating a false alarm through
inspection takes less time than a repair, thus the down time
is smaller. For the baseline (1,0) case, MDT is 171.82 hours,
and for the (4,2) case 17.47 hours. The MDT for the (1,0)
case is high mainly due to NMCS as there is only a stock
level of 1 LRU and parts are ordered on demand, not
schedule. The other major driver for the baseline MDT is
the PM process.

At the low end of the uncertainty factor range, the fixed 10
hour safety factor imposed on each part accounts for a
majority of the lost life each LRU, with the remainder
mostly coming from the component not being able to safely
cover the projected sortie duration. As the uncertainty factor
increases, the mean life lost per component increases as well
due to the uncertainty in the RUL prediction necessitating
replacement before LRU failure. Additionally, the between
mission maintenance window check forwards aircraft for
LRU replacement or repair if the RUL prediction is within
the designated maintenance window and parts are in stock.
Figure 7 depicts the simulation outcome described above,
growing from 15.63 hours to 35.40 hours for the uncertainty
factor 100 case for each FA limit. Taken over the 15 years,
the total life lost ranges from a low of 144506 hours for the
perfect prognostics condition to 321236 hours for the case
where uncertainty factor is 100 and FA limit is unlimited.
This translates to 36.67 years of part life lost for the latter
case. The mean life lost for each FA limit case is
approximately equal at each point, thus they are collocated
in the figure. This results from the fact that while the ISHM
system may require more maintenance, the LRU
components are only replaced as required. Of note is the
max total life lost for the 0 FA limit case is 207901,
occurring at an uncertainty factor of 20. The total life lost
then continues to drop off as the uncertainty factor rises.
This is due to the number of hours being flown by the
aircraft declining as the uncertainty factor increases, thus
not requiring LRU replacement as frequently. The lost
utilization and cost implications of this figure could provide
justification for system implementation. Component life lost
in the baseline case is driven by the time based preventive
maintenance (PM) cycle. In this research, the PM cycle is
set at 400 hours whereby all components with less than 400
hours remaining, by time accounting, are replaced, yielding
a mean life lost of 376.49 and 377.06 hours for the (1,0) and
(4,2) cases respectively.
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4.2. Sensor and Prognostic Degradation Results
A further examination of the impact of a degrading
prognostics capability is examined as well. The Eq. (2)
becomes:
(5)
This degradation factor places an additional uncertainty on
the RUL prediction given as:
Baseline (1,0): 376.49
Baseline (4,2): 377.06

Figure 7: Mean Life Lost per Component
False alarms and maintenance hours are important when
determining cost, support requirements, and system
confidence, but users, whether they are military or
commercial, want to know how often their aircraft are
available and when tasked if they can complete the mission.
Utilizing Eq. (6) to calculate Ao, Figure 8 shows the impact
of uncertainty factor and FA limit. Operational availability
drops from 0.983 for both FA limit levels at an uncertainty
factor of 0 to 0.754 for the uncertainty factor 100, FA limit
0 case and 0.969 for the unlimited FA case. The increase in
downtime to repair the ISHM system in the 0 FA limit case
is the driving factor in the decrease in Ao over the
uncertainty levels. In the baseline cases, Ao is 0.618 and
0.941 for the (1,0) and (4,2) cases respectively. Ao is low in
the (1,0) case again for the NMCS condition.

Baseline (1,0): 0.618
Baseline (4,2): 0.941

Figure 8: Operational Availability

(6)
Where growth factor is either 50 or 200 to provide different
rates of degradation. Referring to Table 1, it is shown that
component MTBF is bounded between 250 and 1000 hours.
Therefore, the impact on RUL uncertainty could grow to
nearly the component life in the case of part P if left
unchecked. The Part ISHM timer is the accumulated life on
the ISHM components associated with a specific
component. The timer is reset upon component replacement
or when a false alarm limit is reached thereby initiating
maintenance on the ISHM system. Degradation factor
increases as a function of the accumulated time on the Part
ISHM timer. Thus, the longer the ISHM system is in
operation, the higher the degradation factor becomes adding
to the uncertainty in the system. As with Eqs. (1) and (2),
Eqs. (5) and (6) are representative equations developed by
the authors to portray the behavior of health monitoring
systems.
Including the degradation factor in the model as in Eq. (5)
shows a false alarm limit may be useful in actual aircraft
operation. Fixing the error factor at 20, towards the lower
end of the range, an exploration of the impact of false alarm
limits is made. The growth factors of 50 and 200, utilized in
Eq. (6), are hereafter referred to as high and low
respectively. These factors correspond to a growth rate of 20
and 5 per hundred hours of accumulated time on the ISHM
system respectively. The degradation factor adds additional
uncertainty to the RUL prediction to examine the effect of
degrading sensor or prognostics capability through use of
the aircraft. In the analysis of degradation factor, FA limit is
the variable of change and is varied from 0 to 100.
Examining the impact of FA limit on mean daily flying
hours for the squadron shows that the 0 FA limit case, for
which every false alarm triggers ISHM maintenance,
dramatically reduces the flying hours. This results from the
amount of maintenance required on the ISHM system
depleting available hours to fly missions. These results are
shown in Figure 9 and indicate that the low degradation
growth rate reduces the flying hours from 32.67 at a FA
limit of 2 to 31.15 at 100. In contrast, the high growth rate
drops the daily hours from 32.16 at FA limit 2 to 27.49 at
FA limit 100. The difference in the magnitude of the
declines lies in the fact that the high degradation rate
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increases uncertainty in the RUL prediction, thus driving
false alarm occurrence up. That is, when the FA limit is 0
and there is a false alarm, the ISHM system is always
repaired. When the FA limit increases to 2, this allows
flights to continue until 2 false alarms are incurred, thus
allowing increased flying hours for the aircraft. The
degradation factor, slow deterioration of prognostics system,
accounts for the remaining decline in daily flying hours.
This results from compounded error in the system
increasing as the time between service lengthens due to the
FA limit being raised.
Baseline (1,0): 0.546
Baseline (4,2): 0.549

Figure 10: Maintenance Man Hours per Flight Hour

Baseline (1,0): 18.36
Baseline (4,2): 27.94

As previously mentioned, Figure 11 is perhaps the best
indicator of the impact of degradation growth rates on
aircraft operations. The high growth rate proves true to its
name as the rate of increase in false alarms per aircraft per
year remains higher than the low growth rate over the range
of FA limits. The number of false alarms increases as a
result of the degradation factor continually increasing as the
ISHM system is not being maintained at the shorter
intervals a lower FA limit brings.

Figure 9: Daily Hours Flown
Figure 3 shows that for a static uncertainty factor of 20 the
MMH/FH was 0.165 and 0.743 for the FA limit 10000 and
0 cases respectively. Figure 10 below shows that the high
degradation rate reaches 0.74 at a FA limit of 100 and the
low rate 0.378. The graph does not show the FA limit 0
MMH/FH data of 2.361 for the low and 2.468 for the high
to allow better visualization of the remaining data. It is
observed in Figure 11 that the impact of the high growth
rate greatly increases the number of false alarms, thus
increasing the maintenance hours required per aircraft flight
hour shown in Figure 10.

Figure 11: False Alarms per Aircraft per Year
The impact of the increase in false alarms, and thus
downtime, is a decrease in operational availability, Ao, as
the FA limit increases. Shown in Figure 12, the Ao trend
follows that of the daily flying hours and inversely the
trends of false alarms and MMH/FH. Operational
availability peaks at a FA limit of 4 for both the high and
low growth rates. The low growth rate levels off around
0.96 at FA limit 60 while the high rate continues a decline
to 0.93 at FA limit 100 without leveling off.
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Baseline (1,0): 0.618
Baseline (4,2): 0.941

Figure 12: Operational Availability
While Figure 11 shows the increased growth in number of
false alarms, the true utility of the model is in determining
the “sweet spot” across the performance curves. This is the
location where a peak or trough in the curves indicates
performance drops off on either side and thus this set of
factors should be considered for system design. In this
paper, examining Figure 10 and Figure 12 show a
performance drop off at a FA limit of 4. shows that mission
reliability declines across all FA limits, indicating that
keeping the FA limit as low as possible is desirable. These
results are specific to the set of inputs used in the model. If
the time for inspection of a failure condition or to repair the
ISHM system were changed, the potential for a different
outcome in FA limits exists. Therein lies the utility of the
model in being able to change input characteristics and
policies to determine system level performance metrics.
In comparing the sensor degradation case in Figure 9 with
the baseline case, daily flying hours remain higher than the
baseline case across the FA limit range. The MMH/FH for
the degradation case with low growth rate remains below
that of the baseline cases, while the high growth rate case is
higher than the baseline cases for FA limits above 40. As
previously discussed, the FA limit “sweet spot” in this
model is 4 thus MMH/FH would be approximately 0.3 and
less than the baseline cases. Comparing Ao between the
baseline and degradation models shows that around the 4
FA limit results, the degradation cases are above 0.96 while
the baseline cases are 0.618 and 0.941 for the (1,0) and (4,2)
cases respectively. This again shows the ISHM system to
provide higher performance. Finally, the mission reliability
for the baseline cases of 84.85% is higher than the ISHM
cases, which are below 70% at the 4 FA limit case. Across
the model metrics the ISHM case with degradation tends
towards higher performance than the baseline. Depending
on the desired performance levels desired for the aircraft
program managers are left to weigh the performance
metrics.

In the model case where degradation is present, for the
uncertainty factor chosen it is generally best to set the false
alarm limit low. Programmatic policy of cost, availability
and reliability will drive towards the selection of a proper
limit. Additionally, changes to degradation factor, i.e. ISHM
sensor and prognostic characteristics, and RUL uncertainty,
prediction algorithm accuracy, can change model outcomes.
Cost to implement a certain health monitoring technology
on the aircraft may outweigh the benefit of its inclusion if it
drives too many false alarms or too much repair time.
Absent the cost impacts of manpower and component
replacement, the decision as to how much uncertainty in
prognostics is an easier proposition. It is shown in the model
with no degradation that as the RUL uncertainty increases,
most performance characteristics are adversely impacted.
The comparison of baseline to ISHM cases shows the
potential advantages implementation of health monitoring
and condition based maintenance. The test for program
managers then becomes selecting the appropriate system
characteristics to meet overall aircraft fleet performance and
cost metrics.
5. CONCLUSION
This research shows employment of an ISHM system
supporting CBM can produce system performance greater
than baseline systems. The main contribution of this effort is
as a simulation tool to compare sensing options and
examine their impact on desired performance factors. The
ability to input ISHM system and aircraft characteristics and
investigate alternative approaches to monitoring and
maintenance makes this tool useful in program decisions on
whether or not to implement monitoring techniques. While
determining causes of system uncertainty is outside the
scope of this research, quantifying the impact of the
uncertainty is demonstrated. As a system designer it is
important to note, as this research shows, the amount of
uncertainty in your system, particularly in the prognostics.
This uncertainty could be mitigated with better sensors,
techniques or processing algorithms. Further, the designer
should seek to minimize either the number or false alarms
the prognostic system produces or set an appropriate limit
on false alarms to minimize the impact of additional
inspection time to adjudicate system condition.
As cost is not included in this work making a true
comparison among options is difficult. A program manager
must weigh the technology costs to achieve the performance
observed in the model and compare those with system
objectives. This task becomes easier if these variables can
be explored across a range of scenarios as this research
provides.
Future work in this research will explore the impact of cost,
supply factors and manpower requirements.
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